No. 33

<Personal values and objective values. Love in the true sense. Absolute individual values and relative values. Sacrificing values and absorbing values>[[1]](#footnote-0)

<§ 1. Classes of value and orders of value in relation to interests and instincts. Common values and goods in the world of community>

Values that need to be classified into rows of lower and higher,[[2]](#footnote-1) values having qualitative differences. Values being objectively there, practically desired. Choice between practically possible values, practically to be made possible. Practically possible values for us we relinquish in favor of the better and best. – This belongs to every choice. Values, being absorbed in the choice by better values, insofar as they are not only dispensed with as such in the “evidence” that they are relatively worthless, practically excluded. (The practically good is the result in the evident choice in original evidence in contrast to the “practically to be discarded” possibilities.) There are values, which can never be relinquished in a certain other sense.

The sensuous value (food) shows a deficiency in comparison to a higher value, as a worthlessness growing to it from relation. But is this not likewise the case with lower “mental” values?

The child is a value for the mother, its endangering is some absolute worthlessness for her. If she herself consents to it, that is, chooses herself that her child, her son, goes into war for his fatherland, or dies as a martyr for a higher good, then the endangering of her son and his possible death do not stop being an absolute worthlessness for her.

Values having no personal roots. Values of value classes, values for everyone. Proper values everyone [459] could evaluate, experience in their beauty, everyone could practically enjoy, possibly increase, acquire, etc. – worthy man, a child in nice development.

But here a practical “striving for the value’s sake” - <striving> for the pleasure’s sake, striving, the goal of which is not an object of pleasure and value of pleasure. Unconditioned direction towards a telos and only then to an increase in value.

1. Values of pleasure, hedonic quantitatively and qualitatively higher – and lower values.
2. Goals – aiming at something, choice in the practical goal. Motives in the choice. The motive of the pleasure’s value and of the best. But do all aims have to be motivated by pleasure?

A goal anticipates pleasure, and every genre of objects that are correspondent to the aiming. <These> are insofar values for the respective subject as well as they bring pleasure, [they are] objective values for it, namely being accepted by it lastingly, if it is directed in a lasting, firm way. But is the value of aiming a value guiding the aiming? This is wrong. The value of pleasure and the value of aiming, pleasure of enjoyment and pleasure of aiming are always to be differentiated. But how? Does not all pleasure fulfill itself in a striving way? Food.

1. General striving, general goals, general instincts, directed towards genres, towards genres of something attainable, and as that enjoyable. The aiming has the intensity of fulfillment, intensity of the fulfillment’s pleasure – according to the special kind of the fulfilling subject respectively. The same = equally fulfilling. And the same kind, the same concrete essence is equally fulfilling. But also different things, differentiated in their own essence, then <something different> according to the genre can fulfill in an equally strong way. There are differences of the more and less, quantitatively, summatorily and qualitatively. Also that, which regards the lasting goods and prepares for cases of need emerging in future (according to the regularity of the instinctive desire), the founded values and goals, goals of the gathering of goods – but not *in infinitum* either, if I alone and goods come into question for me.
2. Aiming at individual targets, inexchangeable with equal and similar ones, absolute direction towards goals. The target object can have beauty comparable with other ones, can be an object of pleasure therein, be a value of pleasure, but as an absolutely [460] individual goal it has an absolutely proper goal value, which indeed, increasable through beauty, is increased, but is not a value of beauty.

Pleasure of food. – I am hungry regularly, but I am not “appointed” to eat in my “personal being”, although in hunger as well I am ever again “called” to look for food, which of course has already been prepared. Then to simply gain the need to care for the regular ability to eat in advance, etc.

The “pleasure”, the enjoying a “worthy man”. – Here I shall not come into question as a personality? What is the general thing here, enabling equality of value, size of value, bigger and smaller value? Everyone is an individual indeed, incomparable. He is a man, I understand him as living towards his goals, and in general in the world, the same surrounding world, in a similar way driven by instincts, by typical needs of a different kind and step – similar -, and now satisfying himself, now not satisfying. I sympathize.

Does this not methodically hint at the fact that the primordial thing first <needs> to be purified, and that then the questions on value can be asked and answered intersubjectively? The general thing, the intersubjectively valid thing, only then enters the horizon. The primordial “egotism”. The primordial reduction of the objectively directed sphere of the mood and the will within the general primordial reduction. The primordial constitution of nature’s objectivity as a primordially reduced one, the primordial striving on the basis of the already constituted nature, whereby we have the problem of how the emotion functions for the constitution of nature as well, together with it thus something generally worthy, a general beauty, a generally interesting thing, <a> field of interest (curiosity) is also already given.

But which interests are as original instincts already linked in advance to the interest directed towards the constitution of nature and thus to objectivation, and lead within the constitutive order in already constituted (primordial) objectivity towards new <objectivities>, towards objects of value, towards practical purposive objects? But only the food-instinct would belong to this abstraction. As a second primal instinct (in contrast to that of “curiosity”). But this shall not be any order. Both are there in one, and properly [461] speaking, hunger is the first. And the instinctive relatedness to others – to the mother in the genesis in advance – is likewise inseparably active, as a “gender instinct”, the generally so-called, in the form of the instinct’s development leading towards others; but we can also say that it is a developing new instinct, founded in the instinct for others. All now is constituted primordially. “Values for others” – as that they are primordially constituted in me, and values are constituted, I experience as the other ones’ values, being my values as well, and those, which are not.

But there is a constitutive order. If world is already pregiven, then of course all my needs, belonging to my Ego in primordiality, my unfulfilled striving, possibly being fulfilled, are <activated> with my pleasure of fulfilling on the basis of my appearances, with the objects accepted by me. Now I have as objects there “nutrition”, which I, if I am hungry, if I am in need of them, can consume. Thus <I have> an open realm of possible equal, higher level and lower level nutritional values for me in the objective surrounding world, and likewise an open realm of products. Food (counted among that the mere provision, acquisition, input, etc.), nutritional goods, and this as practical values of a higher order. Nutrition in general is not immediately ready for enjoying, and finally the seizing it requires strength. Every acquisition is accompanied by the pleasure of acquiring (it has reached), and [by] a bigger one, the bigger the tension that was needed. But still: The effort must necessarily be, and if it is big, it damages the pleasure that cannot follow immediately without suffering. The effort must also be necessary, and superfluous effort is relinquished; something equal, requiring less effort for acquisition, is preferred. Anyway, the value is an actual value for me not as fruit at a tree, where I cannot get immediately, but the fruit brought from there, <the> one made available, directly “available”. Practical goods thus <are> objects of pleasure here, objects of needs, acquired by providing and preparing work as constant availabilities, until they are needed (here: are “consumed”). But now with the constitution of other ones, and a community world, <a> world for all being in the world as subjects of need, the fundamentally new thing emerges: the other one is of my kind, also in the kinds of his needs and the kinds of his objects of needs. According to the general we have one and the same universe of possible nutrition. Now that, which I have made available for me is not available for the other one’s pleasure without further ado. But we are living in the same world, and in such a way that I (and everyone) have my near world with a circle of “neighbors”. And it is accepted to a wide extent: That, which I have made available, prepared, brought here for pleasure, is thereby also prepared for the neighbor and vice versa. But there are incompatibilities of the pleasure here in an original sphere. The goods are in the same way goods for all neighbors, in the same way ready, and yet “devaluated” by this same readiness. Not actually goods for me any more, not actually enjoyable without further ado, rather oppressed now, endangered by the others’ will to enjoy them, if it is convenient to them. “*Bellum <omnium contra omnes.*>” – I thus do not yet have any objectivity of the values thereby yet, no general possibility of value objects being value objects for everyone. It holds true for all values of objects, insofar as they have objectivity for everyone, to be able to be enjoyed, that they need to be accessible. And if the accessing as happening in the common world, can be inhibited by other ones, and if motives can in addition be presupposed as possible in a generally human way, as to be presumed in a supposed way, to deny the access to others, then all values of objects are oppressed, and only actual values, if the danger is removed in a general, and average and sufficient way. This holds true for all cultural values, for the objectivity of culture as objectivity of value. The cultural world as a world of general goods of the corresponding humanity of culture – but related to the orientation structure of the human community. Everyone in the circle of his neighbors, every circle with every circle in mediate intertwining. Closeness and distance everywhere, but chains of mediacies. Everyone in the possibility to be able to strive for goods relevant to him, to be able to make <them> available, to possibly generate and utilize [them] first.

[463] Way of objectivation. An objective world of goods is already there, and yet, it is enlarged over the open infinity of pregivenness. Ever new goods are individually “invented”, and then become common goods. They are already directed to objectivity, to readiness and security for everyone in the invention.

Consideration of the pregiven cultural world as a world of goods and world, in which humanity productively creates culture ever anew. Way of asking back.

<§ 2. Men as persons directed towards things and men as persons directed to persons as persons. Specifically personal values in contrast to objective values>

Objective values as values being enjoyed, as hedonic values summing up, and sums of values as values and as resulting in higher values. Qualitative differences – same kind of pleasure, of the pleasure to enjoy, or rather, of aversion. Equality of value of the qualitatively heterogeneous (of the pleasure’s What). Subjectivity and intersubjectivity of hedonic values. Despite the harmonizing of the pleasure and the dependency on situations, namely dependency on the synthetic unity of the pleasure value, constituting itself in the concrete process of the actualizing enjoying. And yet: A value object as a lastingly equal value for the subject, as in average preparing, enabling the same “pleasure”. Also with the help of the needs’ periodicity. For the hedonic values of the cooking art: Under the same circumstances (same periodically returning hunger presupposed), the same physical freshness and health, the same life circumstances having an impact on the enjoying, normal course of business, the equally pleasant community, etc.: the equally big pleasure.

Specifically personal values. All values are values for persons, and all insofar relate to objects, as that, which has a value for these persons, is some being thing in the world. All objects in the world belong to objective genres, stand in relations of similarity and equality, which simply eventually befits all single things of the lowest [464] kind. Wherever equality determines the same value, we have objective values. Persons as well, being evaluated in the way of equivalence and of respectively higher and lower values, e.g. as a worker according to their (quantitatively to be measured) work performance – whether the measuring now relates to their bodily power, or psychometrically their working capacity in a technical company, or whether they are evaluated according to their empirically determined average performance in working results (number of pieces) -, persons evaluated in such a way are also objective values. What now if we, in quite another way of evaluating, evaluate men in their whole humanity, the way they are for example the father of a family? We also evaluate there according to equality and according to the higher value. Thus we also evaluate personal communities: Companies, clubs of this or that kind, also delegations of cities, parties, peoples, etc., even mental products, mental formations of any kind, historically grown formations and mental performances of the art and science. We “equalize”, we “raise”. And if for example two researchers, considered singularly, have brought about equal performances, we say, the one has brought about a larger life’s work, insofar as he has brought about more performances of the same level.

Considered concisely there are differences, and some things need to be considered. Let us take the kind of values of the nutritional values. Purposively related to hunger and satisfaction within “one hunger”, a plus of food is of higher value. But it holds true for the separation and combining here: One part is “too few”, it does not “stop” the hunger, it reduces its intensity. It is in advance directed towards something quantitative, and towards a whole quantum consisting of the same parts for one single kind of food, otherwise is composed of qualitatively different ones. But nutrition as a value is not nutrition in consumption; it consumes the value through the enjoying, which at the same time is an ongoing quantitative destruction. Nutrition as a value is related to me as a man, having the lasting instinctive need for nutrition, lasting through all periods of hunger and satisfaction. But then again for me as a man among men. We men as such have these general needs and <are> related to the same realm of enjoyable things, nutrition, belonging to nature. The general striving to acquire them belongs to humanity [465], to have them available for future’s horizon, the proper one, and, to a certain extent, the common human future, to prepare them accordingly, in order to make them nutrition, or to improve them as that, etc., and to staple them. Sociality is the precondition here for the objective value not only having a relation for me to me myself, but <also to> my children, my family as such, but then again to other ones, who are suffering. Here we already arrive at the entanglement with interests, pointing beyond the food instinct. Although eventually this genre values is specifically related to everyone’s food-instinct, to everyone’s need to eat and to enjoy, satisfying this instinct.

The instinct towards the mother, entangled with the food-instinct and the instinct of objectivation, works itself out in the empathy, and <in the> most primal human love, as love for the mother. The foreigner appears indeed, but every foreign attracts and repels, frightens.

Security instinct. Love is directed individually. The other way round, mother’s love for the child. The most primal pleasure of a mother – not to eat, to enjoy the pleasure of food herself, but pleasure, primal instinctive striving and satisfaction, that the child, this individual one, enjoys and thus gains its proper pleasure, satisfies every primal proper need. The children are children of this mother not as objective facts, but <they are> values for her in their individuality and related back to the individuality of the mother. All her children are equal to the mother as these values. She can only on the basis of other aspects, e.g. with regard to talent, value this child as higher, the other one as less high, and possibly both equally. The “equalization” of all children is not a comparison of value for a mother, according to more or less. Instead they are the same in that they are beyond all comparison as individual values. I relinquish the lesser good for the sake of the best, which is mostly full of pleasure according to my egological experience in the free choice between nutritional values (free from all other “duties” and free in that they are truly my own, <my> possession). If the value is determined by satisfaction of the need, the value is relative, relativized through possible choice. Namely insofar as the satisfaction can change into dissatisfaction, [466] where some better thing is in question. If I can actually have it, the lesser looses its value. – Absorption of value. If the better is in view, but I am inhibited from enjoying it, the compared higher value damages the value of the lesser one due to the missing, insofar as I should expect it habitually and <have> expected it, or through the annoyance to be inhibited. But insofar as I cannot actually have it, the lesser one remains a value, it fulfills, even if damaged, the need.

<§ 3. Individual value and sacrifice. Love in the genuine sense as a relation of the individual value>

An individual value is not merely a value in general, namely under <the> tacit condition that there is not a bigger value for choice, a value, the practical enabling of which would absorb the lesser one, being at disposition. Rather an individual value, a value exclusively relating to the individuality of the person and the individuality of the evaluated thing, cannot be absorbed at all, but only be “sacrificed”. The choice is and establishes here an unsolvable inner conflict, if simply according to the sense of a choice there is some incompatibility of the disjunct values. To relinquish the one value here means “sacrifice”. – Abraham sacrifices his son to be obedient against God: If God had accepted the sacrifice, then the consciousness to have done, what had to be (was supposed to be) done, still would not have voided the conflict remaining for the whole life, consisting of the fact that the “absolute value” of the child’s life was not <to be> voided by Abraham as a <life> he should have fostered, entrusted to his education and care, and the relinquishing of this “duty”, or rather, the voiding of this value in reality is and remains worthlessness, which Abraham has taken on – as a sacrifice. It now bears down on the soul. A sacrifice does not give any pleasure, however a later pleasure, e.g. in the sacrifice for the fatherland, and in the victory may drown the sacrifice. How is it, if a mother in famine, <in order> to save her child, takes another child’s food? How is it if she, in [467] extreme life risk, in order to save her child, pushes someone else, being in the same distress, into water? What does this mean, and how far does the “Love your neighbor” reach?

It does not say “all men”, but “your neighbor”. The children are the most near to a mother, and only then her husband (although there remain questions, whether this holds true unconditionally and with regard to special vocations of the husband). This relation is a relation of an individual value as well, like love as such in the genuine sense is a devotion to the other one in a feeling-evaluating and striving way, which has its horizon of love in the whole other one’s being as another Ego, an endless horizon. The other one as an Ego is in his life, and therein striving for self-preservation. And thus love is not merely watching and enjoying the other one’s pleasure, if he is doing fine, and regretting if not, but being one with his being in life and striving <in such a way> that foreign pleasure is directly proper pleasure, completely, that foreign striving is (or becomes) proper striving, that the foreign self-preservation itself is taken into my true one and becomes my own. This is not general human love, but something quite singular, excepted, as my love to this individual man, which certainly has not been well described here.

But the relation to all neighbors is a personal, individual relation. The values of brotherly love, grounded as values, having needs behind them that cannot be overruled, or absolute demands, whereas they still could come into conflict and only under sacrifice enable decisions in the choice. The evidence of preferring is of quite another kind than in the absorbing values.

We may say: The proper enjoying remains anonymous, the being sad, desiring, etc. in the purely loving devotion – to be well distinguished from a following reflective considering-oneself-happy in love – , or it has completely the character of the for-the-other-one’s sake, in-the-other-one’s-service, in-his-sense. In enjoying some food, I mentally live the taste full of pleasure as something of my own sphere; thus universally in “egotistic” attitude, in the attitude, in which I am primordial for me and primordially live through my acts. But if I live in the other one in an empathetic way [468], merge in him, it is different. Empathy as such allows for a double way <to> have the other one in front: understanding him as another one, but having him objectively, and to live along in the other life, co-experience, co-consider, enjoy together with him, merge in his being, and thereby possibly strive in his life’s striving. Then I may become aware of myself again for example and stand on the level of proper being, doing, caring, acting in my own context of life and effecting – but now at the same time exiting from the sunkenness into his being, from the being devoted to him and thereby merging-in-him, yet keep this unity, and instead of living in him now live for him – of course in a life circle -, care for him. I prepare for him that, which I in coincidence with him feel as his necessity as what he is in need of. I then do for him in his service, not executing his will as a servant, but still acting not from my own other life necessity, but from his own; this is taken on into mine, as in all genuine care as such. As a genuine one it always demands the merging-in-the-other-one, <the> living-in-him-in-a-self-forgetful-way, and thus in this “coincidence” <the> living-through-his-needs-for-life – in empathy.

But is this consideration of value? How far can I live along, how far even in personal love?

1. Quick considerations. About 8th November 1931. [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
2. They all in the same sense? [↑](#footnote-ref-1)